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Embodiment and Oppression: Reflections on Haslanger, Gender, and Race 
Erin Beeghly 
 “As I understand them, feminist and queer theory consist not only in giving an 
account of the meaning of lives of women and men in all their relational and 
sexual diversity…Feminist and queer theories are also projects of social 
criticism. These are theoretical efforts to identify certain wrongful harms or 
injustices, locate and explain their sources in institutions, and social relations, 
and propose directions for institutionally oriented action to change them. The 
latter set of tasks requires the theorist to have an account not only of individual 
experience, subjectivity and identity, but also of social structures.” —Iris Marion 
Young, On Female Body Experience 
 
In On Female Body Experience, Iris Marion Young argues that a central aim of feminist and 
queer theory is social criticism.1 The goal is to understand oppression and how it functions: know 
thy enemy, so as to better resist. Much of Sally Haslanger’s work shares this goal, and her 
newest article, “Cognition as a Social Skill,” is no exception. In this essay, I will specify what I 
believe is special and insightful about Haslanger’s theory of oppression and her most recent 
addition to it. However, I also explore what it is missing, namely, an account of what Young 
calls “individual [embodied] experience, subjectivity, and identity.”2 Echoing a chorus of critical 
voices, I argue that this omission undermines Haslanger’s ability to effectively theorize group 
oppression and how to resist it. The core problem is this. Haslanger privileges a third-person 
methodology that prioritizes social structures over all else. I conclude by amplifying a collective 
call to action: any adequate theory of oppression must attend to both the lived experiences of 
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individuals and to social structures, that is, to the broad institutional and cultural underpinnings 
of oppression. A theory that does only one, or the other, will fail. Through this analysis, the 
chapter contributes to an overall aim of this volume, namely, to advance our understanding of 
racial and gender-based group oppressions by paying closer attention to facts about embodiment. 
 
Haslanger’s Project: the Big Picture and What’s New 
“Cognition as a Social Skill” begins with a pointed question: how does ideological oppression 
take root? Ideological forms of oppression are distinctive in that they are “enacted unthinkingly 
or even willingly by the subordinated and/or privileged.”3 The phenomenon is especially worth 
theorizing, on Haslanger’s view, because ideological oppression is “insidious” and “far more 
difficult to identify and critique” than “directly coercive” and violent forms of oppression.4 Her 
interest, in particular, is the way in which individuals’ consciousness and agency are “colonized 
under conditions of injustice.”5 In previous work, Haslanger notes that humans have 
“psychological capacities . . . to be responsive to and learn from each other,” and these capacities 
have a role to play in maintaining injustice.6 This new article pushes the point further, elevating 
the concept of mindshaping 
 In a 2001 article, Matteo Mameli introduced the term “mindshaping.” He defines it as 
follows: “A mind-shaping effect is an effect on the development or structure of a mind. My 
telling you that I’ve broken your computer causes a mind-shaping effect in you. It makes you 
angry. My teaching a child how to tie his shoelaces causes a mind-shaping effect on him. It 
makes him able to tie his shoelaces.”7 According to this definition, almost any effect you have on 
someone else is an instance of the phenomenon. If I teach you a fact or a new skill, that’s 
mindshaping. If I make you angry, happy, or sad, that’s also mindshaping.  
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 What Haslanger means by the term is more specific. Mindshaping is a handle for a 
revisionary theory of and approach to human cognition, advocated by philosophers like Victoria 
McGeer and Tadeusz Wiesław Zawidski. It is also a label for a phenomenon central to their 
theories. McGeer and Zawidski’s theories are revisionary for the following reason: they reject 
standard assumptions about human cognition. According to standard views, cognition is 
conceptualized as “an individually realized epistemic capacity,”8 and cognitive activity is 
understood on a scientific model. Babies are likened to tiny scientists in cribs, learning by way of 
hypothesis testing.9 Similarly, adult mental life is described as proceeding in mainly predictive 
and explanatory modes. In contrast, advocates of mindshaping characterize human cognition as 
inherently social, and they emphasize the ways in which group interests and norms shape 
individuals’ minds. 
  Had Haslanger exclusively discussed mindshaping in her article, it would still be worth 
reading. The mindshaping literature is fascinating, and it has yet to receive wide uptake, even 
among researchers who ought to be sympathetic to it.  
  Phenomenologists and theorists of mindshaping are potential allies, for example. Both 
groups have been avid critics of the view that humans’ primary mode of cognition involves 
explanation and prediction. In How the Body Shapes The Mind, phenomenologist Shaun 
Gallagher calls attention to “our pragmatic way of ‘being in the world’” and argues that, 
“phenomenology tells us that explanation and prediction are relatively rare modes of 
understanding others, and that something like evaluative understanding about what someone 
means or about how I should respond in any particular situation best characterize  most of our 
interactions.”10 Additionally, phenomenologists have emphasized the value-laden, normative 
nature of perception and cognition, something that advocates of mindshaping also emphasize. 
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For example, in Visible Identities, Linda Martín Alcoff argues, “Racism is manifest at the level 
of perception itself.”11 Her point is not just that racist predictions and explanations affect what 
we see and do not see. Rather, she suggests that perception involves epistemic practices and 
bodily habits, which embody a kind of racial etiquette.12  
 Consider an example discussed by Frantz Fanon. It’s mid-twentieth century France, and a 
Black man is travelling by train. He is not sure where the dining car is, so he asks someone. The 
person is white. “Excuse me,” he says, “could you please tell me where the restaurant car is?”13 
The white passenger, only half paying attention, responds in pidgin: “Yes sonny boy, you go 
corridor, you go straight, go one car, go two car, go three car, you there.”14 What has just 
happened? One possibility is that the white passenger heard every word spoken by the Black 
speaker perfectly but responded in pidgin in order to keep the man “in his place.” A second 
possibility—and the one that interests me most in this context—is that the white passenger was 
failing to pay full attention. He engaged in the bodily activity of judging someone quickly and 
mindlessly instead of stopping for a minute, listening to what a stranger has said, and responding 
based on the actual facts.15 As a matter of fact, the Black stranger in front of him speaks fluent 
French. Fanon hints that there is a pattern here. Across France, he and a team of researchers 
observed white Europeans behaving in epistemically negligent ways when interacting with Black 
individuals. The pattern suggests a norm was at work: a racialized norm. For white Europeans in 
twentieth century France, the norm was to expend minimal epistemic effort when interacting 
with Black folks in typical social contexts. Black folks were simply “of a type,” and relying on 
racial generalizations was usually sufficient. The norm has consequences for the content of 
perception, for example, what white people hear or do not hear, see or do not see in the context 
of interracial social interactions. It also reveals that both the content of perception, and the 
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behaviors that enable perception, are shaped by social roles. A racial hierarchy—supported by an 
ideology of Black inferiority and “otherness”—stands clearly in the background.  
 Fanon’s example underscores a more general point. By emphasizing the impact of culture 
on perception and cognition, theorists call attention to the fact that humans are trained to see, 
think, and act in different ways. This differential training is tied to social roles, along with the 
stereotypes, scripts, and norms associated with them. The norm-guided nature of cognition 
guarantees that ideology and group hierarchy will shape people’s perceptual and cognitive 
experiences.16 
 Given these convergences, mindshaping as discussed by Haslanger will be interesting to 
a range of antiracist and feminist theorists, including those with methodologies quite different 
than hers. Advocates of mindshaping provide a new kind of argument for claims that feminist 
and antiracist philosophers have traditionally wanted to defend. Mindshaping arguments are new 
because they are rooted in claims about the evolutionary development of humans.17  
 Nevertheless, before feminists and antiracists—or anyone else—can decide whether the 
mindshaping literature is ultimately useful, more information is required. While the approach 
sounds plausible enough, its details get controversial fast. According to Zawidzki, every instance 
of mindshaping has two components: “it aims at something, that is shaping minds,” and “it 
requires representing that which it aims to accomplish, that is, shaping minds in a specific 
way.”18 Yet, as he notes, one must be careful. An advocate of mindshaping cannot interpret 
“representing” as something that requires language. Nor can one understand “aiming at” as 
something an agent does intentionally.  
 Here is why: mindshaping is supposed to be historically prior to mindreading. In other 
words, when it comes to our evolutionary history, humans must have had the capacity to shape 
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others’ minds before we had the ability to attribute beliefs or desires or emotions to others, that 
is, to read minds. Moreover, mechanisms are supposed to explain why human beings have 
evolved to develop sophisticated language. As a result, the representations involved in 
mindshaping must be conceptualized non-linguistically. Mindshaping must be able to occur, 
even if we take no view on what other people think, feel, or perceive and even if we had no 
language in which to conceptualize what they might think, feel, or perceive. 
 The alleged priority of mindshaping raises a puzzling question. How can one shape 
someone’s else’s mind, and “aim” to do so, without having a view about what that person thinks 
or even a language in which to think? As Zawidzki notes, this is a hard question. But it must 
have an answer if mindshaping is to be a viable model of cognition. Here is the key if he is right: 
“The goals, functions, purposes, or aims that help constitute mindshaping are [and must be] 
understood teleofunctionally, that is, in terms of what the mechanisms associated with 
mindshaping were selected for in evolution.”19 Accordingly, he defines mindshaping as follows:  
To state the definition formally, mechanism X mindshapes target Y to match model Z in 
relevant respects R, S, T . . . if and only if (1) effecting such matches is X’s “proper 
function” in Millikan’s (1984) sense; (2) X is performing its proper function, that is, 
causing Y to match Z in respect to R, S, T . . . (3) Y is a mind, understood as a set of 
behavioral dispositions or the categorical basis for them; (4) X’s performance of its 
proper function is guided by representations of R, S, T . . . ; and (6) Z is or is somehow 
derived from an agent other than the agent to which Y belongs.20 
 
 This definition says a lot, and what it communicates to me is this: “Caution!” Though 
mindshaping resonates with claims that I find appealing, the required assumptions for endorsing 
the model are quite heavy. People do not mindshape; mechanisms do. Some of these mechanisms 
are subpersonal: they are exclusively “neural.”21 For example, Zawidzki discusses “a series of 
powerful yet counterintuitive experimental results in social psychology” that suggest, “human 
beings automatically, unintentionally, and unconsciously match each other’s non-functional 
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behaviors.”22 These behaviors include “postures, mannerisms, gestures, facial expressions, and 
accents.”23 The finding sheds light on perceptual habits: how long we look at people, whether we 
look them in the eye or not, whether we look at people’s lips when they are talking so we can 
hear them better, and so on. If humans naturally mimic one another, we may learn to be biased 
simply by being immersed in a culture and instinctively following the lead of others.24 Other 
mechanisms are partially outside the brain and are “distributed across multiple agents, such as in 
pedagogy or guided imitation, where a teacher can help the target match the model.”25 In all such 
cases, we must say that the mechanisms “have an aim” and “a proper function.” Moreover, to get 
the model going, we must say that the relevant neural or extra-neural mechanisms are guided by 
“representations” in a very specific teleofunctional sense. Furthermore, one must be willing to 
endorse an extremely controversial evolutionary story about how, when, and why these 
mechanisms were selected and the way in which language emerged out of mindshaping. 
 I am not, in principle, against endorsing controversial claims. My point is this: readers of 
Haslanger’s article deserve to know the philosophical and empirical baggage associated with 
mindshaping. Since Haslanger cites Zawidzki approvingly and relies on his evolutionary story, 
she appears to be endorsing the above claims. As readers, we deserve to know whether she thinks 
that the mindshaping model (for example, as developed by other theorists like Victoria McGeer) 
requires such claims and why we ought to endorse them. Zawidzki is emphatic. Without an 
evolutionary story, there is no way to establish the priority of mindreading over mindshaping, or 
vice versa. “The distinction between mindreading and mindshaping,” he writes, “cannot be 
captured in terms of simple empirical tests . . . no crucial experiment can vindicate one 
understanding at the expense of the other.”26 Both models of social cognition embrace the same 
empirical results; they just understand their significance differently.  
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 Let me now briefly turn to a related issue. Haslanger’s “Cognition as a Social Skill” is 
not just about mindshaping. Indeed, she is only interested in mindshaping for instrumental 
reasons, in particular, because it purports to explain why humans participate so naturally in 
oppressive patterns of thought and action. Haslanger writes, “I aim to show how social meanings 
shape thought and action and how this provides us with resources for thinking about ideology 
and ideology critique.”27 This way of putting her project takes the emphasis off of mindshaping 
and places it on culture. Culture, she explains elsewhere, “is a network of social meanings, tools, 
scripts, schemas, heuristics, principles, and the like, which we draw on in action, and which 
gives shape to our practices.”28 To better analyze culture’s role in the colonization of 
consciousness, Haslanger deploys a new set of conceptual resources in her article, borrowed 
from sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and political scientist James Scott. The novel additions to her 
theory bring her account of oppression into deeper conversation with a wider set of literatures in 
sociology, history, and political science. They also serve to supplement her existing account of 
the ways in which people absorb—as well as resist—oppressive views and practices.  
 
An Aesthetic and Political Interlude 
Now that I have sketched what is new and provocative in Haslanger’s article, something needs to 
be said about my experience of reading it. Haslanger quickly introduces five new concepts—
mindshaping, doxa, heterodoxy, orthodoxy, and hidden transcripts—into a theory that already 
boasts an impressive amount of technical terminology. The article is also peppered with intricate, 
hard-to-following diagrams.  
 Contemplating the images, my head spins—and not in a good way. Haslanger’s theory is 
already complicated, and these new additions make it even more so. Her implicit promise to 
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readers is this: “Bear with me. The tools of social science can explain ideological oppression.” 
Yet the analysis often feels byzantine, and the payoff elusive. One cannot access what is 
interesting about it simply by reading. There is too much jargon, too many moving parts. 
Because of this, engaging with Haslanger’s new article requires a costly investment. One must 
sink weeks and weeks, if not longer, into doing the research that illuminates the significance of 
the various distinctions, concepts, and arguments. Her main ideas do not jump off the page and 
explain themselves. The argument’s lack of accessibility and transparency were a problem for 
me.  
 As I reflected more, I realized my reaction had feminist roots. Beautiful articles—articles 
that I aspire to write and read as a feminist philosopher—are not esoteric. They are both 
intellectually challenging and accessible. Accessibility is a paramount virtue, for which I am 
willing to sacrifice tremendously.  
 When I think of these virtues, I think of theorists like Iris Marion Young and bell hooks. I 
think, too, of what I call “the bell hooks rule.” In her first book ain’t i a woman: black women 
and feminism, hooks writes: 
I decided early on that I wanted to create books that could be read and understood across 
different class boundaries. In those days, feminist thinkers grappled with the question of 
audience: who did we want to reach with our work? To reach a broader audience required 
the writing of work that was clear and concise, that could be read by readers who had 
never attended college or even finished high school. Imagining my mother as my ideal 
audience—the reader that I most wanted to convert to feminist thinking—I cultivated a 
way of writing that could be understood by readers from diverse class backgrounds.29  
 
As hooks notes, accessibility and clarity are crucial, aesthetically and politically. This is also 
writer Claudia Rankine’s position. In a recent interview, Rankine talks about her first book, 
Don’t Let Me Be Lonely, the predecessor of Citizen. She says: 
One of the things that I wanted in Don’t Let Me Be Lonely was for the language to be 
transparent. I didn’t want people to have to stop and think, I don’t know what she means 
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by that. I wanted it to feel simple, accessible, conversational. As a writer, this was the 
challenge—How do you get the ideas of Butler or Laurent Berlant or Derrida or all the 
reading you’ve done, inside the seven sentences that say, I saw this thing and it made me 
sad? And how do you do it in a way that the research material is not effaced, that trace 
elements are still present? That seems to me always to be the challenge—to create 
transparency and access without losing complexity.30 
 
One might complain: Rankine writes poetry, not philosophy. Yet philosophers like hooks and 
others celebrate these same virtues.  
 Why, one might ask? Note what hooks says above. One cannot “convert” a broad 
audience to feminist or antiracist thinking if the texts that one writes are loaded down with jargon 
and written in ways that alienate even sympathetic, expert readers. To whatever extent it is 
possible, theorists who care about social liberation, and whose work supports antiracist and 
feminist values, must render their work accessible, clear, and compelling. The stakes of success 
are high. Understanding oppression is not a mere academic matter: people’s lives, wellbeing, and 
freedom are on the line. The issue is not just persuading individuals that there is a problem but 
creating the social bases for collective action and institutional change. 
 All of this is to say: I felt, and feel, conflicted about Haslanger’s “Cognition as a Social 
Skill.” While it is chock full of interesting concepts and insights, good feminist and antiracist 
theory ought to be accessible. However, this new piece drifts into obscurantism. Obscurity and 
complexity are not the same thing.  
 One might object that the subject matter requires a technical treatment and obscurity can 
be a virtue. An unsympathetic interlocutor might say, “Perhaps you are too simply stupid to 
understand, Beeghly! Or just plain lazy.” Maybe, but I doubt that. I identify as a pluralist, trained 
in both the analytic and continental traditions. I am not against specialized terminology or theory, 
and I certainly am not opposed to rolling up my sleeves and digging into an unfamiliar literature. 
Despite all this, I found the article alienating. Its arguments felt cumbersome, the concepts 
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opaque. The mode of address was impersonal and, from my perspective, it sent the wrong 
message about who the “insiders” and “outsiders” in the discussion really are.31  
 
The Problem of Embodiment 
As I thought about the accessibility of her new work, it began to dawn on me that there was 
another, related problem. Often Haslanger uses personal experience as a touchstone for 
theorizing. For example, in “Race & Gender: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to 
Be?,” she begins her analysis by noting, “It is always awkward when someone asks me 
informally what I’m working on and I say that I’m trying to figure out what gender is.”32 
Similarly, in “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy,” she opens with a personal 
observation about her experience as a woman in philosophy, announcing: “There is a deep well 
of rage inside me. Rage about how I as an individual have been treated in philosophy; rage about 
how others I know have been treated; and rage about the conditions that I’m sure affect many 
women and minorities in philosophy, and have caused many others to leave.”33 When writing 
about adoption, family, and race, Haslanger also makes it clear that the subject matter is 
personal: she is an adoptive parent of two African American children.34 I love these personal 
moments. They are powerful and announce to readers the stakes of her philosophical work. 
However, personal reflections are absent in “Cognition as a Social Skill.” 
 One could argue that the omission is coincidental and that she could add a few vivid 
examples to make the theory more accessible. I suspect the fix is not so easy. As far as I can tell, 
the failure to cite personal experience—hers or anyone else’s—in the essay is a symptom of her 
methodology. 
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 Consider the framework Haslanger uses to explain ideological oppression—a framework 
that constitutes one of her philosophical accomplishments and which she has developed carefully 
over the last decade. Four concepts are foundational: social practices, which are “patterns of 
behavior that enable us to coordinate and distribute resources”35; social structures, or, “sets of 
interconnected practices”36; social relations, that is, “links between nodes in a structure”37; and 
ideological formations, described as “the practices, institutions, along with the thinking and 
acting shaped by ideology,”38 which simultaneously justify and help constitute the system as a 
whole. Within this conceptual landscape, individuals are understood as “nodes” in social 
structures. As nodes, they are integral to the system. Yet there is no exploration of the ways in 
which individuals actually experience oppression in a phenomenological, embodied sense. 
Moreover, actual individuals (like you and me) are irrelevant to the theory; the theory is only 
interested in individuals qua abstract social types.39  
 Haslanger’s view of gender and race fit nicely with this model. To be a woman, 
according to Haslanger, is to occupy a particular position in a social structure. She formulates the 
view as follows: “S is a woman if S is systematically subordinated along some dimension 
(economic, political, legal, social, etc.) and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by 
observed of imagined bodily feature presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in 
reproduction.”40 According to this view, what makes someone a woman is not her lived 
experience or relationship to gender norms. What makes someone a woman is that she is 
subordinated in particular ways due to her perceived reproductive function. Haslanger’s account 
of race is analogous. To be Black, for example, is to be subordinated because of one’s real or 
imagined bodily features—such as a person’s skin color or hair texture—that serve of markers of 
African ancestry.41 
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 There are problems with accounts like this, and they are not about accessibility per se. 
Haslanger’s analysis of oppression, like her view of gender and race, lacks an account of what 
Young calls “individual [embodied] experience, subjectivity, and identity.”42 The omission is not 
accidental. When Haslanger explains ideological oppression, she intentionally frames her 
explanations in terms of social structures and the processes by which they are maintained. Such 
processes can be described without resorting to the nitty-gritty details of any particular 
individual’s psychology, including facts about how it feels for someone to inhabit a certain kind 
of body.  
 Many feminists and critical race theorists will object here, and rightly so. Compare 
Haslanger’s view with Iris Marion Young’s. Like Haslanger, Young offers a structural analysis 
of gender. “What it means to say that individual persons are gendered,” Young argues, “is that 
we all find ourselves passively grouped according to these structural relations, in ways too 
impersonal to ground identity.”43 However, Young does not end her analysis there. Instead she 
argues that a theory of gender—defined structurally—must be supplemented with an analysis of 
the lived body.44 The addition is necessary to avoid the mistake of defining what it means to be a 
woman simply in terms of oppression. Being a woman ought to be a feature of oneself that can 
be lifted up and celebrated. 
  Young also sinks time and effort into understanding oppression from an embodied 
perspective. The lived body, she writes, “is a unified idea of a physical body acting and 
experiencing in a specific sociocultural context; it is a body-in-situation.”45 Drawing on research 
in the phenomenological tradition, including the work of Simone de Beauvoir and Toril Moi, she 
fills out the concept of a lived body in a vivid, relatable way. “Each person,” Young writes, “is a 
distinctive body, with specific features, capacities, and desires . . . is born in a particular place 
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and time, is raised in a particular family setting, and all these have specific sociocultural histories 
that stand in relation to the history of others in particular ways.”46 Each lived body is therefore 
unique. On the other hand, individuals face a range of limitations and possibilities that apply 
across the board to people like them. So there will be commonalities in how people live out their 
embodiment.  
 With the concept of the lived body, intentionality and agency rise to the forefront. “The 
most primordial intentional act,” Young writes, “is the motion of the body orienting itself with 
respect to and moving within its surroundings.”47 We can choose to go this way or that, respond 
to an obstacle blocking our path in one way or another. Similarly, she argues, individuals have 
options in terms of how they respond to the “systems of evaluation and expectations” that shape 
and constrain them.48 “The idea of a lived body,” Young explains, “recognizes that a person’s 
subjectivity is conditioned by sociocultural facts and the behavior and expectations of others in 
ways that she has not chosen. At the same time, the theory of the lived body says that each 
person takes up and acts in relation to these unchosen facts in her own way.”49 The interplay of 
choice and constraint is constant.  
 To better understand this interplay and its significance, we might look to other theorists 
who explore agency under conditions of oppression. Consider the work of Alisa Bierria.50 Bierria 
is interested in “the experience and practice of disenfranchised subjects who act intentionally 
despite/against/within conditions of oppression and violence.”51 As a case study, she considers 
the experience of Janice Wells, a 57 year-old Black schoolteacher from Georgia. In Spring of 
2012, Wells called the police to report a suspected would-be intruder. The officer who arrived at 
her home demanded that she provide the name of the person whom she believed to be prowling 
around. When Wells refused, the officer “proceeded to threaten to take her to jail, chase, 
	 15 
handcuff, and pepper-spray her.”52 A second officer arrived and repeatedly tasered Wells, as she 
begged him to stop. In her analysis of the case, Bierria enumerates the ways in which Wells 
exercised agency throughout the encounter: calling the police to report someone on her property, 
withholding information from the officer who arrived after he behaved disrespectfully, moving 
to the front of her house perhaps in the hopes of making their conflict more visible, running 
when he grabbed her, and pleading with the second officer to stop assaulting her. The issue is not 
that Wells lacked agency, Bierria says. The problem lies in how the officers’ constrained her 
agency—harming her and violating her rights—and how they systematically distorted the 
meaning of her actions, viewing her actions through the lens of misogynistic and racist 
stereotypes. Bierria writes: “Instead of asking, how did Janice Wells’ agency fail, we might ask, 
what kind of agency did Wells exercise before, during, and after the assault? How was her 
agency (dis)positioned with respect to institutional racism and sexism, and how might we 
describe her choice-making in those conditions?”53 To accurately describe Wells’s “choice 
making,” her own, first-personal view of the matter is invaluable.54 Wells is not a passive agent, 
but someone who exercised a great deal of resistance when interacting with police. Bierria’s 
heterogeneous model of agency reveals that Wells, and people like her, routinely exercise their 
agency in a variety of ways within and against oppressive social structures.  
 The work of María Lugones is similarly illuminating in this respect. Lugones—an 
immigrant to the U.S. from Argentina and a Latina philosopher—is particularly interested in 
“outsiders” like herself. Outsider existence, as she sees it, is defined by “perspectival 
flexibility.”55 As an outsider, one must perceive oneself through the lens of dominant groups, 
becoming fluent in their perspectives: for example, the specific ways in which they tend to 
objectify you, how they stereotype or misinterpret you, and so on. However, outsiders also know 
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that they are seen in alternative ways in social niches where they are more at home and have 
insider status. This perspectival knowledge—a kind of “double consciousness,” as explored by 
Du Bois—is a product of the fact that one inhabits multiple worlds at once and must travel 
between worlds.56 Famously, Lugones argues that outsider experience reveals a deep truth. All of 
us—insiders and outsiders—have more than one self: the self in this world and the self in other 
worlds. This multiplicity of selves makes agency possible even under conditions of oppression. 
One can see oneself in ways that are not sanctioned by dominant ideologies and the groups that 
create them, even in conditions where one’s agency and individuality are seemingly quashed. 
Lugones writes: “the oppressed know themselves in realities in which they are able to form 
intentions that are not among the alternatives that are possible in the world in which they are 
brutalized and oppressed.”57  
 Haslanger might interject: I, too, recognize the importance of individual agency and the 
way in which embodied experience reveals it! If individuals were not agents with particular 
identities and experiences, there would be nothing for culture to colonize. Hidden transcripts and 
heterodoxy would not be possible if humans had no choice but to conform. Moreover, 
embodiment is built into my theory of oppression via Bourdieu’s notion of a habitus. A habitus 
consists in a set of bodily dispositions, which enable one to relate to and move through the world 
in particular ways. She even says as much, writing, “Social meanings are responsive to our 
embodied engagement with the world.”58  
 Notice the difference, though. While Haslanger’s theory of oppression presupposes the 
existence of embodied experience, she does not engage with embodied experience or individual 
agency on its own terms. Haslanger offers a top-down structural theory of oppression, 
supplemented by a discussion of mindshaping. Mindshaping mechanisms are “exclusively 
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neural” or they are “socially distributed.”59 First-person experience is not central to the model. 
Nor does mindshaping provide any handle on how or why individuals could resist oppression 
and exercise their agency, for example, by creating hidden transcripts. Indeed, one of the upshots 
of mindshaping is that habitual actions and patterns of thought are constitutive of the social 
structure.60  
 The metaphor of colonization—freely invoked by Haslanger—is telling. Colonizers saw 
colonized peoples as passive and naïve. They sought to control them and appropriate their 
resources. According to Haslanger, social meanings do the same thing to you and me. Social 
meanings colonize our consciousness and agency via mindshaping mechanisms. Our inner 
resources are thus appropriated, taken over. This is precisely my point. In this picture, individual 
agency and embodied, first-personal experience are things that have been coopted, usurped 
vessels used for social-structural purposes. It is thus unclear how humans could ever retain our 
agency in any meaningful sense and how a critical consciousness could emerge.  
 One is thus entitled to press Haslanger. How and why is resistance possible, if we accept 
her theory of oppression? How, exactly, do historically and socially situated individuals and their 
agency fit into the theory’s explanations of how oppression works, both in general and in specific 
contexts? What is the justification for bracketing first-person, embodied experience? If these 
questions remain unanswered, we cannot be confident that Haslanger’s theory satisfies an 
important desideratum for a theory of oppression. Lugones put it like this: any adequate theory of 
oppression must be liberatory. To fulfill this desideratum, a theory cannot leave the “ontological 
or metaphysical possibility of liberation” unargued for, uncovered, and unexplained, as 
Haslanger’s theory does.61 We must know how and why freedom and agency are able to unfold 
in conditions of oppression. Mere lip service to the possibility is not enough. Without an 
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explanation of how and why agency is possible, the theory is “useless from the perspective of the 
oppressed person.”62  
  
The Problem of Embodiment: Theoretical and Practical Ramifications 
The fact that I am circling back to these concerns is not surprising. They constitute a constant 
thread in critical appraisals of Haslanger’s recent work. Gathering these critical voices together, I 
amplify their call to action. 
 
Criticism 1—Pigeonholing and Disrespect  
One thread of criticism goes as follows. Because Haslanger’s theory ignores embodied 
experience, it ends up pigeonholing individuals in problematic ways. Though Young could 
certainly lodge this criticism, one finds it articulated forcefully by other feminists and antiracist 
theorists. Katharine Jenkins, for example, argues that Haslanger’s account of gender is 
disrespectful to transgender women.63 Diagnosing why, she points to the purely structural nature 
of Haslanger’s view. To count as a woman, according to Haslanger, you must be perceived as 
having a certain kind of body, namely, one capable of fulfilling a female reproductive role. As 
Jenkins notes, some trans women will not be subordinated for this reason. They will be 
subordinated for other reasons. If so, they are not truly women, according to Haslanger. Jenkins 
objects: “The concept of being classed as a woman [in the structural sense] and having a female 
gender identity” should be given equal weight in feminist theory.64 If feminists would give these 
concepts equal weight, they could craft an analysis of gender suitable for liberatory purposes. 
Haslanger cannot do this, Jenkins explains, because her analysis prioritizes social structures and 
excludes first-person, embodied experience. 
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 A parallel criticism concerns Haslanger’s account of race. According to Haslanger, to be 
Black is to be oppressed. However, as Janine Jones notes in her review of Resisting Reality, 
Black individuals often understand being Black as something to be valued. They do not define 
their existence by their oppression, but rather, view Black identity as a source of pride.65 
Consider Imani Perry, who recounts the messages that she received on social media in the 
aftermath of protests against George Floyd’s death at the hands of Minneapolis police. These 
messages seemed to presuppose that “blackness is the most terrible of fates.”66 “Let me be 
clear,” Perry says, “Racism is terrible. Blackness is not.”67 She writes: 
I cannot remember a time in my life when I wasn’t earnestly happy about the fact of my 
blackness. When my cousins and I were small, we would crowd in front of the mirrors in 
my grandmother’s house, admiring our shining brown faces, the puffiness of our hair. 
My elders taught me that I belonged to a tradition of resilience, of music that 
resonates across the globe, of spoken and written language that sings. If you’ve had the 
good fortune to experience a holiday with a large black American family, you have 
witnessed the masterful art of storytelling, the vitality of our laughter, and the everyday 
poetry of our experience.68  
 
Perry also echoes the words of Zora Neale Hurston in her essay, “How It Feels to Be Colored 
Me.” Hurston refuses to believe that she is “tragically colored” and has been given “a lowdown 
dirty deal” by nature.69 She delights in her identity and heritage. “Sometimes I feel discriminated 
against,” writes Hurston, “but it does not make me angry. It merely astonishes me. How can any 
deny themselves the pleasures of my company? It’s beyond me.”70 Positive views of Blackness 
such as these are ignored by Haslanger’s structural analysis. Jones puts the problem like this: 
Haslanger’s methodology fails to recognize “that so many ordinary Black people who theorize 
their lived experience are experts on race.”71  
 Once more, the political significance of Haslanger’s third-person methodology rises into 
view. To write about oppression in a way that prioritizes structural analysis, and ignores first-
person experience, is to send a message. The message is that everyday people are not experts 
	 20 
when it comes to how oppression functions. A quite different message is conveyed when 
theorists recognize the value of lived experience and harness its insights in their work. By 
centering lived experience, they communicate to readers that individuals from historically 
marginalized groups have special knowledge about the harms of oppression, as well as how to 
resist oppression. Their experiences living in hierarchical social conditions, their emotions and 
their anger, constitute invaluable epistemic resources. To ignore such experiences is, arguably, to 
exercise a kind of disrespect. 
 
 Criticism 2—Explanation & Agency 
 Remember that Haslanger characterizes individuals as nodes in a structure. One could 
perhaps argue that this way of describing human beings is disrespectful because it characterizes 
individuals as interchangeable, agency-deprived cogs. However, there are explanatory worries in 
the vicinity as well.  
 Consider this one. Theresa Lopez and Bryan Chambliss argue that Haslanger’s 
explanations of individual choice are incomplete. According to Haslanger’s theory, individuals 
act in certain ways because of their location within historically contingent, culturally specific 
social structures. Yet not all individuals react to the constraints of their social position in the 
same ways. Two similarly situated people might have radically different relationships to social 
norms; they may have conflicting values and preferences, as well as divergent attitudes toward 
risk. If so, structural explanations cannot tell the whole story about individual choice. What we 
need, Lopez and Chambliss argue, are explanations of choice that appeal both to unique features 
of individual psychology as well as social structures. They call these “integrative explanations of 
choice.”72 
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 Critical race theorists often argue for integrative explanations as well. There is a vast, rich 
literature here. I mention two recent examples from sociology. First, in “Producing 
Colorblindness: Everyday Mechanisms of White Ignorance,” Jennifer Mueller criticizes 
structural models of colorblindness.73 On her view, these models ignore the fact that white 
individuals minimize and deny their complicity in racial injustice in inventive and ever-
resourceful ways.  
 To illustrate the point, Mueller offers empirical evidence. While teaching a course on 
racial inequality and intergenerational wealth, Mueller asked students to complete an assignment 
about the wealth transfers in their family’s history. “In terms of wealth and capital accumulation 
and transfer,” she notes, “the full pool of papers documents over six times as many transfers of 
monetary assets across generations within white families than families of color. Intergenerational 
land, home, and business inheritances were similarly disproportionate.”74 White students also 
reported that their families historically benefited from state-sponsored policies designed to 
benefit white people as a group.75 As part of the assignment, Mueller required students to 
critically analyze the ways in which their family did or did not benefit from racist policies and 
institutions. When evaluating their responses, she noticed a pattern. White students were 
consistently evasive. They tended to twist the truth, create dubious narratives that absolved their 
families of racial guilt, and generally deflect responsibility. They did so in unique and inventive 
ways. 
 Consider an example. One student—Carmen—“began by suggesting how ‘very difficult’ 
it was ‘to tie any of the course readings’ to her data because her family had no ‘large ties to 
slavery or oppression.’”76 At the same time, Carmen noted that her family owned slaves prior to 
1864. One might have expected this student to observe that her relatives enslaved and exploited 
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Black labor for their own financial benefit and were, in this way, able to grow their wealth. 
Instead she argued that slavery was “an expendable part of my family’s wealth,” hence, not very 
important in the overall scheme of things, because one of her relatives freed his slaves at the 
close of the Civil War. According to family lore, these freed slaves decided to keep working for 
the family, even though they could have struck out on their own. As Mueller notes, this student 
did something interesting that was not a mere matter of habit: she combined “an old racist 
stereotype [of the happy, loyal slave who loves his white master] with a uniquely reasoned color-
blind argument to neutralize an inconvenient fact and reject course premises.”77 Such maneuvers 
need to be recognized for what they are, says Mueller: creative, resourceful attempts to maintain 
white ignorance that exceed generic colorblind narratives.  
 Second, consider Glenn Bracey and Wendy Moore’s research on racial segregation in 
Evangelical churches.78 Noting that structural explanations of segregation dominate the 
sociological literature, they argue that such explanations hide the ways in which Evangelicals in 
majority-white churches actively exclude potential Black congregants. Bracey—a Black man and 
devout Evangelical Christian—gathered the data himself. In his fieldwork, he found that 
spontaneous “race tests” functioned as invisible tools of segregation in white Evangelical 
churches. For example, at a majority-white mega church, he was introduced to a Black woman 
with an interracial child. Bracey’s white host told him that he was a godsend. Congregants had 
been praying for someone who could serve as the boy’s father.79 The implication was that 
Bracey, because he was Black, was the answer to their prayers. At a different church, he was told 
that he would be a great addition to the church’s choir, even after he explained that his 
background was in ministry and he would prefer a speaking role in church outreach.80 To pass 
“utility-based” race tests such as these, Bracey and Moore argue, people of color must prove that 
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they are content to play the role that white people envision for them and can be trusted not to 
disrupt white space. To illustrate a second kind of race test, Bracey recounts arriving at the home 
of a congregant in a secluded, rural area for a prayer meeting. From how he was greeted, it is 
clear that the host had expected him to be white. She asks her husband to give Bracey a tour of 
their home, including their bedroom, which is chock full of Confederate memorabilia. In his field 
notes, Bracey writes: “They were clearly Confederate sympathizers, and they wanted me to 
know it. Evangelical Christian or not, I was not welcome in this home.”81 Fearful, he quickly left 
the property. “While we acknowledge the role that macrosocial forces play in maintaining 
segregation,” Bracey and Moore argue, “we contend that structural relations require institutional 
dynamics and human actors.”82 
 Though these sociologists do not engage with Haslanger’s work specifically, their 
criticisms apply to her theory. Like Young, Bierria, and Lugones, they argue that one cannot 
adequately explain how oppression functions without paying close attention to embodied agents 
and the ways in which they exert their agency within social structures. Their distinctive 
contribution is to explore how individuals from dominant groups exert their agency in conditions 
of oppression in ways that reflect, and entrench, an unjust status quo. 
 
Criticism 3—Embodiment & Resistance 
A final thread of criticism focuses on Haslanger’s account of resistance. In “The Uses of 
the Erotic,” Audre Lorde writes, “The erotic cannot be felt secondhand.”83 It can only be felt 
first-hand, from the inside. Explaining what she means, Lorde writes: “As a Black lesbian 
feminist, I have a particular feeling, knowledge, and understanding for those sisters with whom I 
have danced hard, played, or even fought. The deep participation has often been the forerunner 
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for joint concerted actions not possible before.”84 As Lorde observes, being together with others 
in an embodied way—dancing, sweating, arguing—is a source of solidarity. However, this 
source of solidarity is obscured if we use a methodology that focuses exclusively on structural 
aspects of social reality, for example, habitual patterns of behavior or thought. 
  Alex Madva makes a complementary point. In addressing sexism, racism, and other 
forms of injustice, Haslanger recommends that we focus our activist energy on structural-level 
reforms. Madva thus dubs her a “structural prioritizer.”85 Structural prioritizers argue that we 
should reform social structures, and individual-level changes will follow. For example, if we 
better integrate neighborhoods using public policy, racial prejudices will decrease. Echoing the 
other critics mentioned so far, Madva takes issue with the strategy: “I believe that it is false and 
misleading to claim that we should prioritize structural over individual change.”86 While 
reforming social structures are critically important, we need both kinds of changes to fight 
oppression; moreover, structural-level interventions must be accompanied by individual-level 
interventions in order to be maximally stable and effective. 
 In a similar vein, Robin Zheng criticizes Haslanger’s exclusive emphasis on structural 
reform. “It is all very well to say that we need structural solutions rather than reformed 
individuals,” she writes, “but it is much less obvious what kind of collective action should be 
taken and how.”87 According to Zheng, justifying collective action to individuals requires 
convincing them that they should take personal responsibility for unjust social structures. 
However, questions of personal responsibility are “necessarily addressed from the first- and 




Know thy enemy, so as to better resist. In Madva and Zheng, in Jenkins and Jones, in Lopez and 
Chambliss, as well as others, one hears the echo of Iris Marion Young. A purely structural theory 
of oppression, Young argues, cannot explain how oppression insinuates itself in the lived body, 
as well as the variety of ways in which individuals perpetuate and experience oppression. Nor 
can it explain how and why resistance is possible. To adequately explain oppression and to 
illuminate modes of resistance, a theory must incorporate both social structures and the lived 
experiences of individuals.89  
 One might object that lived experience resists theory. It is too varied and diffuse and 
personal. However, I would call attention to the numerous theorists of injustice who take 
seriously first-person, embodied experiences, while also keeping the structural in view. Think of 
Frantz Fanon, María Lugones, and bell hooks. Think of contemporary critical race theorists in 
sociology and psychology like Bracey, Moore, and Mueller.90 The powerful work of such 
theorists—and many others—is a testament to the possibility, as well as the desirability, of a 
truly liberatory philosophy that attends to both social structures and lived experience. 
 Despite its new bells and whistles, “Cognition as a Social Skill” thus returns us to a basic 
problem. Haslanger deploys the third-person tools of social science—graphs and charts and a 
focus on abstract structures—to illuminate the phenomenon of ideological oppression. We even 
get an evolutionary story and new concepts added to the mix. Yet, as far as I can see, the 
resulting theory only underscores the need, more than ever, to give embodied experience its 
proper due. The way forward, I propose, is to pay closer attention to feminist and antiracist 
theorists who have lifted up lived experience as a crucial source of knowledge, while also 
analyzing the broad institutional and cultural underpinnings of oppression. Taking their cue, we 
can see how to effectively integrate these two modes of inquiry and, in so doing, better 
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